


This article was downloaded by: [SOAS, University of London]

On: 24 October 2013, At: 03:42

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/reno20>

External Cultural Ties and the Politics of Language in China

Enze Han ^a

^a Dominican University , USA

Published online: 21 Oct 2011.

To cite this article: Enze Han (2013) External Cultural Ties and the Politics of Language in China, *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 12:1, 30-49, DOI:

[10.1080/17449057.2011.621402](http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2011.621402)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2011.621402>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

External Cultural Ties and the Politics of Language in China

ENZE HAN

Dominican University, USA

ABSTRACT This paper utilizes the China Language Usage Survey to examine the political and social economic conditions under which language maintenance and shift occur. The empirical analysis of 54 ethnic minority groups in China shows that forces of modernization such as urbanization are positively correlated with the level of linguistic assimilation. Institutional support for ethnic minority language education is also a significant indicator for minority language retention. External forces are, however, even more significant in explaining linguistic assimilation and ethnic language retention. Minority groups that have relationships with external kin in neighboring countries should find it much easier to resist assimilative pressures from the domestic majority and the state than would other groups that do not possess such relationships with external kin groups.

Introduction

Language choice is often a political game in multiethnic and multilingual societies. The majority group will try to impose its language on ethnic minorities, who might also have an interest in keeping their own languages alive and will thus resist the majority's linguistic assimilation efforts.¹ In such a tug of war, why do some ethnic minority groups resist linguistic assimilation more than others? What factors lead such groups to preserve their own language? If we believe the politics of language choice has social and economic origins, we want to explore what specific factors condition groups either actively to acquire the majority group's language or to resist it. Understanding linguistic preservation versus assimilation, also called language maintenance and shift, among different ethnic minority groups will help us understand a great deal about political and socio-economic conditions in multiethnic and multilingual societies (Paulston, 1994, p. 6).

Existing theories of language choice base their explanations primarily on domestic factors. Some consider language choice a result of macro-historical forces such as modernization and state-building (Deutsch, 1966; Weber, 1976; Gellner, 1983). Factors such as urbanization and the role of schooling have been particularly emphasized (Fishman, 1964, 1980). Some primarily consider language choice a function of economic incentives

Correspondence Address: Enze Han, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Dominican University, River Forest, IL 60302, USA. Email: ehan@dom.edu

(Laitin, 1998). Still others consider language planning in multilingual societies—such as what languages people speak and how many—as political games between the political center and linguistically distinct regions (Laitin, 1988, 1989). However, there has not been much discussion of the role of external factors, such as ethnic groups' external kin relations, in ethnic language maintenance and shift. Indeed, recent studies in ethnic politics have called for more attention to be given to the role of international factors (Brown, 1996; Lake & Rothchild, 1998). In particular, some scholars have started to examine systematically how external kindred groups affect ethnic minority groups' relationships with the states the minority groups inhabit (Brubaker, 1996; Jenne, 2007). This paper follows this line of research and probes the relationship between external kin relations and ethnic groups' language maintenance and shift. Specifically, it forwards the argument that language choice can be explained partially as a question of whether these ethnic minority groups have external kin relations beyond the current state border.

In particular, this paper examines the landscape of language use in contemporary China. As a land-based empire with a vast territory and diverse population, China is still undergoing its nation-building process. Nation-building in the Chinese case, as in many other countries in the past and present, involves a vision of integration and homogenization. This process is by no means a smooth one, and issues with China's internal ethnic minorities remain contentious. Particularly with regard to the Tibetans and Uyghurs, China has received tremendous international criticism for its heavy-handed responses to these two groups' pursuits of increased autonomy or even secession from the Chinese state (Shakya, 2000; Bovingdon, 2004). Other than pursuing policies at repressing dissent, the Chinese government has also undertaken policies aimed at economic integration of its geographic peripheries and cultural assimilation of its ethnic minority population. Pertinent to this discussion of the politics of language, the Chinese government has lately tried to reform its ethnic language education curriculum by increasing the use of Mandarin in schools in ethnic minority regions. Typically, it involves switching to Mandarin as the language of instruction of all subjects while the ethnic language remains as one subject (Schluessel, 2007).² A recent attempt to do this in an ethnic Tibetan region in Qinghai province led to protests by thousands of Tibetan students and teachers.³ Resistance in Tibet and Xinjiang notwithstanding, there are many ethnic minority groups in China that are already actively pursuing linguistic and cultural assimilation into the majority Han Chinese society (Diana, 2009; Han, 2011). Or, as will be seen later in the Chinese Language Usage Survey, the ability to speak a Han Chinese language varies widely from one Chinese ethnic group to another.⁴ More significantly, many ethnic groups living in China's peripheral areas have ethnic kindred groups across international borders. Thus, it is important to probe how external kindred relationships affect language maintenance and shift.

This paper utilizes recently available Chinese Language Usage Survey results to probe systematically the political and socio-economic conditions under which language maintenance and shift occur (PRC State Council Language Commission Language Usage Survey Office, 2006). It employs the constructivist approach to understand how identities change with statistical tests on language usage among 54 ethnic minority groups in China.⁵ It probes why different ethnic minority groups have varying levels of proficiency in the Chinese language versus their own mother tongues. The empirical analysis shows a positive correlation between forces of modernization such as urbanization and levels of linguistic assimilation. Institutional support for ethnic minority language education is also

a significant indicator of minority language retention. However, external forces are even more significant in explaining linguistic assimilation and ethnic language retention. Specifically, this paper forwards the argument that the linguistic assimilation of ethnic minorities in China can be examined in the context of whether or not these minority groups have external kin beyond the current state border. Minority groups that have relationships with external kin in neighboring countries might find it easier to resist assimilative pressures for the majority Han Chinese and the Chinese state than groups without such relationships.

The paper begins with a brief discussion of the linguistic and ethnic diversity in China and why it is a particularly useful example for studying linguistic assimilation and identity change. It then turns to a review of the literature on language maintenance and language shift and provides testable hypotheses about the conditions in which ethnic minorities are more or less likely to speak the majority group's language. This is followed by a discussion of the data and research findings. Following the statistical analysis, the paper uses the several ethnic groups in China to demonstrate the possible causal story for how external kindred relationships affect a group's bilingual situation. It concludes with a discussion of the implications for ethnic language maintenance in China and in multiethnic and multilingual societies in general.

Ethnic Minorities and Linguistic Diversity in China

As China is a multicultural and multilingual country, studies on its ethnic diversity are a burgeoning field of scholarly inquiry. Spanning across a large territory, China cuts across several 'civilization zones', as Samuel Huntington (1993) calls them, including the Confucian/Mahayana Buddhist core in the east, Islam and Tibetan Buddhism in the west, and Theravada Buddhism in the southwest. Officially, there are 55 ethnic minority groups residing within the territory of the People's Republic of China in addition to the majority Han Chinese. According to the 2000 National Census, the Han Chinese majority constitutes about 91.4% of China's population, at 1.1 billion. The 105 million ethnic minority people make up the remaining 8.6% of the population.⁶ Ethnic minority groups' populations range from a few thousand people to more than 10 million (Table 1). China is also linguistically diverse, with an estimated 80–100 languages spoken. Those languages stem from a variety of linguistic families, including Sino-Tibetan, Turkic-Altaiic, Indo-European and Austro-Asiatic (Stites, 1999, pp. 97–98).⁷ Not surprisingly, almost all ethnic groups in China have their own languages.⁸

There is great variation in terms of an ethnic minority group's ability to speak a Han Chinese language in addition to its own language, according to a national Language Usage Survey published by the People's Republic of China State Council Language Commission in 2006. The survey contains one section on the language ability of ethnic groups, including data on percentage of each ethnic minority group that has the ability to speak a Han Chinese language, as well as data on the percentage of each ethnic minority group that has the ability to speak an ethnic language.

Table 2 provides a list of ethnic minorities in China and their varying ability to speak Han Chinese and their own languages. From the table we can see that some groups are already linguistically assimilated into the Han Chinese-speaking majority. For example, the Manchus—the last rulers of imperial China during the Qing Dynasty—have overwhelmingly lost their ability to speak Manchu, and according to the survey 99.99% of Manchu

Table 1. Fifty-six ethnic groups in China and their population

Ethnic group	Population	Ethnic group	Population
Han	102,207,565	Tu	241,198
Zhuang	16,178,811	Mulam	207,352
Manchu	10,682,262	Xibe	188,824
Hui	9,816,805	Kirgiz	160,823
Miao	8,940,116	Daur	132,394
Uyghur	8,399,393	Jingpo	132,143
Tujia	8,028,133	Maonan	107,166
Yi	7,762,272	Salar	104,503
Mongol	5,813,947	Blang	91,882
Tibetan	5,416,021	Tajik	41,028
Buyi	2,971,460	Achang	33,936
Dong	2,960,293	Primi	33,600
Yao	2,637,421	Ewenki	30,505
Korean	1,923,842	Nu	28,759
Bai	1,858,063	Gin	22,517
Hani	1,439,673	Jino	20,899
Kazak	1,250,458	Deang	17,935
Li	1,247,814	Bonan	16,505
Dai	1,158,989	Russian	15,609
She	709,592	Yugur	13,719
Lisu	634,912	Uzbek	12,370
Gelao	579,357	Monba	8,923
Dongxiang	513,805	Oroqen	8,196
Lahu	453,705	Derung	7,426
Shui	406,902	Tatar	4,890
Wa	396,610	Hezhen	4,640
Naxi	308,839	Gaoshan	4,461
Qiang	306,072	Lhoba	2,965

speak Han Chinese. On the other hand there are groups such as the Tajik, of whom only 6.6% speak Han Chinese, while 99.75% can speak their own language. Most ethnic minority groups who exhibit varying degrees of linguistic assimilation lie between these two extremes, which indicates a great degree of bilingualism. The question is why some of these ethnic groups have managed to resist linguistic assimilation more than others in China.

China is a country that has undergone tremendous change and upheaval in the past century. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) made the consolidation of China's territorial boundaries possible based on the CCP's claims dating from the imperial Qing Dynasty.⁹ Inspired and influenced by the 'success model' of the Soviet Union, the CCP decided to adopt a political structure that would grant ethnic minorities certain autonomy regarding rights of self-government, although the clause allowing ethnic minorities to pursue self-determination, which was included in the Soviet Union's Constitution, was later dropped by the CCP.¹⁰

The CCP's policies towards its ethnic minority population have several components. First, to set up a system of autonomous governments for minority groups throughout the country, ranging from autonomous regions down to autonomous townships (Dreyer, 1976). In the 1950s, the Chinese government also carried out an Ethnic Identification

Table 2. Ethnic minority groups in China and their ability to speak Han Chinese and ethnic minority languages

Ethnic group	Han Chinese language	Ethnic language	Ethnic group	Han Chinese language	Ethnic language
Manchu	99.99%	0.01%	Dongxiang	85.70%	71.05%
She	99.99%	0.20%	Korean	84.11%	93.99%
Hezhen	99.99%	2.67%	Bai	83.54%	91.37%
Gelao	99.87%	1.46%	Jino	81.95%	96.86%
Hui	99.66%	4.60%	Lahu	81.46%	94.85%
Tujia	99.39%	6.63%	Yi	81.43%	69.07%
Russian	99.27%	49.51%	Naxi	80.45%	98.34%
Bonan	99.11%	49.25%	Zhuang	79.99%	86.16%
Achang	98.75%	86.15%	Ewenki	78.67%	94.23%
Qiang	98.61%	14.66%	Blang	77.94%	96.93%
Oroqen	98.58%	59.72%	Salar	73.95%	62.41%
Yugur	98.14%	64.26%	Mongol	71.83%	75.52%
Gin	97.72%	93.37%	Lisu	71.18%	98.72%
Li	95.51%	89.18%	Hani	68.28%	94.61%
Buyi	94.55%	50.33%	Nu	60.27%	98.19%
Daur	92.50%	87.13%	Tu	59.58%	84.02%
Miao	92.12%	59.70%	Shui	58.67%	90.77%
Jingpo	92.09%	97.50%	Tibetan	51.87%	90.40%
Deang	89.65%	99.90%	Derung	48.12%	95.79%
Yao	89.47%	74.90%	Tatar	43.25%	98.96%
Xibe	89.36%	93.87%	Kazak	42.37%	99.08%
Dong	89.04%	57.27%	Lhoba	35.43%	89.74%
Dai	88.58%	98.28%	Uyghur	19.88%	99.74%
Maonan	88.03%	47.53%	Uzbek	16.09%	98.12%
Wa	87.24%	99.26%	Monba	13.22%	97.52%
Primi	86.81%	97.77%	Kirgiz	12.21%	98.28%
Mulam	86.26%	91.23%	Tajik	6.60%	99.75%

Project to categorize different ethnic groups living in China. This led to the official recognition of 55 ethnic minority groups (Harrell, 1995, pp. 22–24; Gladney, 2004, pp. 9–13). The government has also carried out language planning policies such as standardizing minority languages, creating or reforming minority language scripts, and providing support for ethnic minority language instruction (Stites, 1999).

There is also a big defining feature for many ethnic minority groups in China—that is, many of them have external cultural ties. Geography plays a large part in this. China shares with Russia the distinction of possessing borders with the most countries in the world: 14.¹¹ In China's case these are: Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Vietnam. Many ethnic groups living in China's peripheral areas are separated from their ethnic kin by international borders. Although many ethnic groups are indigenous only to China, there are more than 20 groups that have substantial numbers of external kin relations (Table 3). Given this wealth of potential data, in terms of both scale and domestic and international factors, China is a good case to test empirically what factors contribute to ethnic minority groups' motivation either to pursue or to resist linguistic assimilation.

Table 3. Ethnic minorities in China with external kin relations

Ethnic group	Main external kin distribution
Achang	Mainland Southeast Asia
Blang	Mainland Southeast Asia
Dai	Thailand and Burma
De'ang	Mainland Southeast Asia
Ewenki	Russia
Gin	Vietnam
Hani	Mainland Southeast Asia
Hui	Central Asian Republics
Jingpo	Burma
Kazak	Kazakhstan
Kirgiz	Kirghizstan
Korean	North Korea and South Korea
Lahu	Burma
Lhoba	India
Lisu	Burma
Miao	Mainland Southeast Asia
Monba	India
Mongol	Mongolia and Russia
Russian	Russia
Tajik	Tajikistan
Tatar	Russia
Tibetan	India, Nepal and Bhutan
Uyghur	Central Asian Republics and Turkey
Uzbek	Uzbekistan
Wa	Burma
Yao	Mainland Southeast Asia

Explaining Linguistic Maintenance and Shift

A clear picture of language choice can help us understand certain aspects related to identity change and maintenance in multiethnic and multilingual societies. Even though language does not equal ethnic identity, language always occupies a prominent position in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism, particularly in studies on the formation of modern nation states and the politics of national self-determination (Fishman, 1972; Anderson, 1983; Safran, 1992). Language is often considered as a necessary condition for membership in the national imagined community, and contested language use is an essential part of ethnonational politics. Indeed, according to Gellner (1983), the politics of nationalism is a process where low cultures compete with each other for high culture status so that their own language can be promoted as the single tongue for the entire nation.

For practical reasons, language may be one of the most viable measures of ethnic and cultural identity. David Laitin is one of the most vocal proponents of this view. He treats language 'as a proxy for culture and linguistic assimilation as an indicator of cultural assimilation' (Laitin, 1998, p. 368). Language and ethnic identity can be closely related, and linguistic assimilation is one of the most amenable factors to use for empirical measurement and testing.¹² Therefore, understanding why people adopt a different language helps us understand some of the mechanisms behind the process of identity change and maintenance in general. During the modern nation-building process, one

common expectation is that the consolidation of modern states would lead to the assimilation of minority languages, which in turn would lead to changes in ethnonational identities. Against this backdrop, there is also a powerful counter-wave that is exemplified by how some language minorities in modern/modernizing states strive to maintain their languages and resist the linguistic assimilation imposed on them by the majority group. There is literature we can consult to explore factors that relate to language maintenance and shift.

Identity construction and the politics of nationalism, according to many, are essentially products of 'macrohistorical forces' such as modernization (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 851). As Karl Deutsch argues, '[A] decisive factor in national assimilation or differentiation was found to be the fundamental process of social mobilization which accompanies the growth of markets, industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass communication' (Deutsch, 1966, p. 188). Thus, industrialization and rural–urban migration increase contact among previously isolated people, which would instead demand cultural uniformity, that is, the use of the 'same shared and standardized linguistic medium and script' (Gellner, 1983, p. 35). Urbanization, in particular, has been one of the most documented factors in the study of language maintenance and shift (Fishman, 1964, p. 53). Also crucial to this homogenizing process is the universal education that an industrial society demands. It is through the school system that a common culture is transmitted, which confers a certain identity on people (Gellner, 1983, p. 36). Thus, for the purpose of our exploration of linguistic assimilation, this first approach would imply that we should look for variables that are indicative of the modernization process, such as the urbanization process and whether ethnic language education is present to counter the universal modern education states want to impose on their citizens.

There are also theories that explore how political institutional structures shape identity formation and change (Bunce, 1999; Posner, 2005). In research on colonial and post-colonial settings, institutions of the colonial state were often credited for ethnic group identity formation and social division (Laitin, 1986; Prunier, 1995). In the context of communism and post-communism in Eastern Europe, Soviet and post-Soviet states, scholars have paid great attention to how the institutional structure of national federalism demarcated clear boundaries among people, both territorially and ethnically, which then paved the way for various secessionist movements (Roeder, 1991; Suny, 1993; Leff, 1999; Walker, 2003; Hale, 2004). Institutions in autonomous regions are believed to be conducive to the growth of separate identity of a titular group (Cornell, 2000). Thus, to explain language maintenance and shift, one can examine whether there is a presence of institutional mechanisms that can provide ethnic groups authority for alternative expression and reproduction.

In addition to these two sets of domestic structural factors, we can also think of ethnic groups' language choice and identity construction as conditioned by factors beyond the territorial boundary of a state. Indeed, recent scholarship on ethnic politics has shown the significant role of international factors in domestic inter-ethnic relations (Brown, 1996; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Saideman, 2001). Of particular interest here is the role of external kinship relations among ethnic minority groups in multiethnic societies.

One prominent trait of the current international state system is the fact that many so-called nation states are in fact multiethnic societies. The reason for this is that state borders have often been demarcated in a fashion that arbitrarily cuts through existing ethnic group boundaries. Especially for groups that live in the geographic peripheries of a state's territory, their ethnic brethren more often than not live across the official state

border. There is thus a plethora of triadic relations that involve a state, its ethnic minorities and the minorities' external kin (Weiner, 1971). Brubaker (1996), for example, argues that such triadic relationships prompt a new way to understand the phenomenon of nationalism. The majority state has its interest in enforcing uniformity through the promotion of a common national language. The ethnic minorities will often try to defend their cultural autonomy and resist assimilative forces. In addition, there are the minorities' external kin groups, which also seek to 'monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, assert the rights, and protect the interests of "their" ethnationally kin' (Brubaker, 1996, p. 6).

Following this logic, one can argue that the presence of external kin relationships can play a significant role in an ethnic group's decision in favor of language maintenance or shift. For groups that have external kin relations, there are great opportunities and resources for the maintenance of their own linguistic repertoire and identity relative to the domestic majority and the assimilative state. There are several possible causal stories for why this might be the case. The peripheral status of the areas inhabited by some ethnic minority groups means that they are geographically closer to the areas inhabited by their external kin. There might be dense economic, cultural or religious networks that connect the ethnic group with its external kin, and thus provide more opportunity and incentive for the ethnic group to keep its own language intact. The external kin group might also possess significant resources for funding language teaching or cultural projects. Or perhaps there are more linguistic and cultural products such as books and radio or TV programs produced by external kin so that the ethnic group might have more means to keep its language alive. In addition, some external kin might have a special interest in monitoring the language situation of their ethnic brethren. Therefore, we can posit that there might be a positive relationship between the presence of external kin and ethnic group language maintenance. Furthermore, minority groups' ability to resist linguistic assimilation should also be correlated with the power of their external kin to monitor and support them. That means powerful external kin might be better endowed with economic resources, and they might have the ability to check the domestic majority's assimilative policies and intentions.

After this cursory review of relevant literature, the following set of hypotheses can be derived to explore the relationship between domestic and international factors and language choice.

H1: An ethnic minority group is more likely to maintain its language if the group experiences low levels of urbanization.

H2: An ethnic minority group is more likely to maintain its language if there is ethnic language education available to counter unifying state education in the majority group's language.

H3: An ethnic minority group is more likely to maintain its language if the group enjoys higher levels of institutional autonomy.

H4: An ethnic minority group is more likely to maintain its language if it has external kin relations, and this likelihood will increase if its external kin has more power.

Data and Measurement

In order to test these hypotheses on language choice in China, a data set including 54 ethnic minority groups in mainland China is composed. The data set has two main parts. The dependent variable of language maintenance and shift comes from the Language Usage Survey, published by the PRC State Council Language Commission in 2006. The independent variables included in the data set are: urbanization rate, ethnic language instruction, institutional autonomy level, presence of external kin relations and external kin power. Data for these variables are sourced primarily from the *China Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2005*, published by the PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission Economic and Development Department and PRC State Statistical Bureau Department of Integrated Statistics (2006), and several other publicly available sources.¹³

The dependent variable—language choice—is measured in two ways. Various ethnic groups' ability to speak Han Chinese is the first metric. The second is ethnic groups' ability to speak an ethnic language (see Table 2). Data are all in percentage points and it should be noted that high degrees of bilingualism exist among various ethnic minority groups in China, indicating that learning Han Chinese and retaining one's own language are not necessarily contradictory.¹⁴ However, both measures together should be able to offer an opportunity to test the hypotheses about language choice.

Data on these two measurements are from the Language Usage Survey carried out by the PRC State Council Language Commission, the largest language survey in the PRC's history. The survey was conducted between August 1999 and September 2001 and published in 2006, covering all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in mainland China. Additionally, the sampling of the survey was based on a Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method. The target population was between 15 and 69 years old. In total, approximately 475,000 effective responses were included in the survey data. The drawback to using these survey data is that they only contain data on a single point in time. Thus, historical processes that may have played out over long time periods, such as previous linguistic assimilation and its effects on ethnic identity, cannot be easily accounted for. Also, unfortunately, the published data have been aggregated on the group level, which prevents analysis on the individual level. Acknowledging these limitations, this survey is by far the best available source to date language use in the PRC. It should at least be able to offer us some rough insights on the issues of language maintenance and shift among China's various ethnic minority groups.

The set of independent variables is measured in the following fashion. The urbanization variable is calculated based on the percentages of different ethnic minority groups in China that live in urban areas (PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission Economic and Development Department and PRC State Statistical Bureau Department of Integrated Statistics, 2006, pp. 664–665). In China it is quite straightforward to calculate the rural/urban rate for different ethnic minority groups because of the household registration system (*hukou*), which delineates rural and urban residents. One note of caution, however, is that the data do not include temporary laborers who flock to the cities from rural areas. Despite this, the data overall should be representative of the urbanization setting for various groups. The variation in group urbanization is between 4.3% (Dongxiang) and 81.4% (Russian) with mean of 24.5%.

In order to measure whether there is ethnic language education present to counter state education in the majority Han Chinese language, a dummy variable is generated to control

for whether different ethnic groups have access to education in their own languages. Since the 1950s, the Chinese government has implemented policies to standardize ethnic minority languages and promote bilingual education among certain ethnic minority groups (Zhou, 2001). Coding of the variable is based on whether a 'maintenance type' of bilingual education is available for a certain ethnic minority group: '1' for a group that has a 'maintenance type' of bilingual education and '0' for those with none (Stites, 1999, p. 108). A 'maintenance type' of bilingual education is one that aims to preserve and cultivate pupils' mother tongue.¹⁵ This is in contrast to other types of bilingual education practiced in China, such as 'transitional type' and 'expedient type', which were designed to help ethnic minorities develop competence in the Han Chinese language (Stites, 1999, p. 107). Thus, this variable should be able to capture the differences in terms of groups' access to ethnic language education that is not granted in ordinary state schools.

Different ethnic minority groups' autonomy level is measured by the highest level of administrative autonomy granted to a certain ethnic group. The data are coded according to the following scheme: '3' for groups enjoying autonomous region status, which is the equivalent of provincial authority; '2' for groups that have autonomy at the prefectural level; '1' for autonomy at the county level; and '0' for less than autonomy at the county level. There are five autonomous regions in China, 30 autonomous prefectures and 120 of autonomous counties (PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission Economic and Development Department and PRC State Statistical Bureau Department of Integrated Statistics, 2006). The five autonomous regions are: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Finally, data on whether a certain ethnic minority group in China has external kin relations are derived primarily from the Ethnologue's section on China.¹⁶ Here, I generate two variables to capture the role of external kin relations. The first is a dummy variable for the presence of external kin that is quantified as follows: '1' for groups that have external kin relations and '0' for groups that do not. A separate variable is then generated to take into consideration the level of external kin power. Here, power of external kin is measured based on the level of political organization external kin enjoys: '3' for external kin enjoying independent statehood; '2' for external kin enjoying a certain level of political autonomy in their own host states or having a highly organized exile government; '1' for external kin who are also internal minorities that do not have autonomous power in their own host states; and '0' for groups that do not have external kin present.¹⁷

Data Analysis

In order to test how both domestic and international factors affect ethnic groups' language choice, the paper utilizes ordinary least squares regression analyses.¹⁸ The results are reported with robust standard errors in Tables 4 and 5.¹⁹ In Table 4, the dependent variable is ethnic groups' ability to speak the Han Chinese language. In Table 5, the dependent variable used is ethnic groups' ability to speak their own languages. The effects of external kin ties are presented in two specifications—one uses the presence of external kin as a dummy and the other measures the political power of external kin ties. All four models control for ethnic groups' population according to the 2000 National Census, for which logarithms are taken.

Table 4. Ethnic minority groups' ability to speak Han Chinese

Independent variables	External kin dummy	External kin power
Urbanization	0.60*** (0.19)	0.68*** (0.19)
Ethnic language education	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.21** (0.09)
Group autonomy level	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
External kin ties	-0.16** (0.06)	
External kin power		-0.09*** (0.03)
Logged group population	0.06*** (0.06)	0.06*** (0.02)
Constant	0.04 (0.24)	0.05 (0.23)
Observations	54	54
R-Squared	0.39	0.43

Note: Robust standard errors are reported.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$.

Table 5. Ethnic minority groups' ability to speak ethnic languages

Independent variables	External kin dummy	External kin power
Urbanization	-0.77*** (0.28)	-0.85*** (0.27)
Ethnic language education	0.28*** (0.10)	0.22** (0.10)
Group autonomy level	0.06 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.07)
External kin ties	0.21*** (0.06)	
External kin power		0.10*** (0.03)
Logged group population	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.07*** (0.03)
Constant	1.63*** (0.25)	1.65 (0.25)
Observations	54	54
R-Squared	0.39	0.39

Note: Robust standard errors are reported.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Language Choice} = & \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Urbanization} + \beta_2 \text{Ethnic Language Education} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{GroupAutonomy Level} + \beta_4 \text{External Kin Ties} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{Group Population} + e. \end{aligned}$$

The regression analyses show there is strong support for some of the hypotheses regarding why some ethnic minority groups are able to maintain their own languages

while others have shifted to the majority Han Chinese language. First, the modernization force, which is measured by the rate of urbanization, is positively correlated with various ethnic groups' ability to speak the Han Chinese language and negatively correlated with their ability to speak their own languages. All effects of urbanization are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. That is, the more urban the group, the less likely the group is to resist linguistic assimilation from the majority Han Chinese. It seems that urbanization provides a strong incentive for minority groups to master the majority Han Chinese language, which is generally the lingua franca in urban areas in China. On the other hand, the more rural a group is, the more likely it is to be able to isolate itself from Han Chinese language influence and thus keep its own languages intact. In addition, it is also evident that if an ethnic group has access to education in its own language, its members are more able to speak their own languages and less likely to speak the majority Han Chinese language. The effects are also statistically significant in all four specifications. For instance, if we control for external kin ties as a dummy, groups that have institutionalized access to education in their own languages are 13% more likely to speak their own languages and 16% less likely to speak the Han Chinese language than groups that do not have such access. This demonstrates the crucial role of ethnic language education in keeping alive an ethnic group's language and resisting the inroads of the Han Chinese language in the groups' communities. The results show strong support for the hypotheses regarding the impact of urbanization and ethnic schooling on ethnic minority groups' language maintenance and shift. The impact of institutional autonomy, however, seems insignificant in my analyses.

In particular, the role of external kin ties is statistically significant throughout the data analyses. For example, the rate of speaking the Han Chinese language is predicted to be 21% lower for a group with external kin ties than for a group without them. Likewise, for a group that enjoys external kin relations, the rate at which it speaks its own language is predicted to be 25% higher than for a group without them. When the level of political power for the ethnic groups' external kin is controlled, its effects are also quite significant. For example, the groups whose kin enjoy independent statehood are the ones most likely to keep their own linguistic repertoire and resist the linguistic assimilation from the majority Han Chinese. For such a group to speak its own language, the predicted value is almost 94%.

The effects of group population as the control variable are a bit puzzling. It indicates that the larger a group is, the more likely it is to speak the majority Han Chinese language and the less likely it is to speak its own language. One interpretation of this result is that a large group is perhaps more likely to have been targeted for assimilation throughout Chinese history. Another interpretation is that the reported relationship is rather an indication of the effect of group concentration. Indeed, group concentration has been identified as highly correlated with ethnic group political mobilization (Toft, 2002, 2003). That is to say, geographically concentrated groups are either more likely to consider the land as indivisibly theirs and thus more willing to fight for it, or group concentration offers favorable opportunity structure to facilitate collective action (Weidmann, 2009). Similarly, we can argue that geographically concentrated groups are perhaps the ones more likely to retain their own languages too. In China's case, many large ethnic groups, such as those in South-west China, are spread across vast territories and are thus more susceptible to influence from the majority Han Chinese. On the other hand, some smaller groups living in the peripheries, such as the Tajik, might be able to carve a compact language community for themselves owing to their relative concentration. Owing to the unavailability of good group concentration data in China, further research is needed to study this relationship.

In addition to the set of independent variables analyzed above, a few other variables are also tested separately for the robust test. Owing to the relatively small *N* of the data set, it is not advisable to include too many variables in the analyses. The other variables used for robust tests are political repression, ethnic group literacy rate, elite mobility and religion.²⁰ These variables do not change substantially the effects of the main independent variables.

Explaining Language Maintenance and Shift

Statistical evidence from the analyses of the China Language Usage Survey gives us a rough sense of what factors influence ethnic minority groups' language maintenance and shift patterns. The findings shed light on the issues of ethnic and linguistic diversity within China and the contradictions between China's nation-building efforts and multiethnic and multilingual reality. Although the data available cannot offer us a longitudinal analysis to compare changes over time, they at least offer a glimpse of some of the structural factors that affect various ethnic minority groups' language usage and different rates of language retention in China.

Domestic factors such as urbanization and ethnic language education provision are crucial indicators. Stevan Harrell (1993, p. 101) once noted that 'nowhere does the conflict between the two models of a political system—empire and nation state—manifest itself more acutely or more ambiguously than in the People's Republic of China'. Despite the multiethnic and multilingual nature of Chinese society, in recent years the Chinese state has embarked on a more aggressive approach towards assimilation. Education in the Han Chinese language has been actively promoted in ethnic minority regions at the expense of ethnic minority language education (Dwyer, 2005; Schluessel, 2007). The promotion of education in the Han Chinese language instead of ethnic languages is one of the primary factors that have caused discontent among ethnic minority people, such as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs. This paper's statistical analysis has demonstrated that the provision of education in ethnic minority languages is a significant indicator of ethnic language maintenance. Thus, it can be argued that if those provisions are to be abandoned or diminished, the future of language maintenance and cultural autonomy for ethnic minority groups in China is not very rosy.

In particular, the findings presented here support the argument that inter-ethnic relations are not merely dyadic ones between the minority and the majority. They can also be the product of interactions between domestic and international factors. Specifically, the presence of external kin for minority groups adds more complexity to the existing inter-ethnic relations within the domestic arena. This paper demonstrates that a strong positive relationship exists between external kin ties and ethnic language maintenance. It thus supports theories that emphasize the crucial role of external kin in the development of ethnonationalist politics. So how exactly can external kin ties affect ethnic minority groups' language maintenance? Here I shall identify several possible causal pathways, and illustrate them using ethnic minority groups in China as examples.

The first explanation for the role of external kin ties is essentially the role of geography. The reason for many ethnic groups in China having external kin ties is because these groups are located in China's geographical periphery. Thus, presumably the distance between the geographic area that these groups inhabit and those inhabited by their external kin is probably closer than the cultural centers of China proper. Although this situation might not hold much longer with the ever increasing relocation and migration of Han

Chinese to the peripheries, we can still say that geography itself perhaps explains why it is more likely for these groups to keep their languages alive. For example, the reason why the Tajiks and Kirgiz report low levels of proficiency in the Han Chinese language (6.6 and 12.21%, respectively) is perhaps because these two groups are located in mountainous border regions that are difficult to access. For example, the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County is extremely difficult to reach because of bad road conditions.

The peripheral geographical location also means that these ethnic groups have easy access to the areas inhabited by their external kin in neighboring countries. In many of the areas along China's southwestern borders with Burma, Laos and Vietnam, the locals can easily cross the border without much documentation, needing only to obtain a Border Pass (*bianminzheng*) to cross into neighboring countries, not an official passport. Such easy access thus provides incentives for the local ethnic minority people to keep alive their own languages for the purpose of easy communication. In addition, the frequency of cross-border trade and close cultural and religious ties make these groups susceptible to cultural influences from outside China. For example, Thomas Borchert noted how the computer font for the Dai-lue language in Sipsongpanna (Xishuangbanna), a Dai autonomous prefecture in the southwestern province of Yunnan, was invented in the Burmese Shan State and then introduced to China by Dai monks (Borchert, 2008, p. 108). In the case of Sipsongpanna, close ties between the Dai Buddhist monks there and their counterparts in Burma and Thailand allow Chinese Dai monks and novices to cross the border for religious education, which is often conducted in the Dai language or other similar languages (Borchert, 2006).

More importantly, some ethnic minority groups' external kin might have a wide variety of cultural products and an ability to export them to the areas inhabited by these ethnic groups. In recent years, South Korea's economic prosperity and vibrant culture have led to a 'Korean Wave' (*hanliu*), with China importing a large quantity of movies, TV shows and music from South Korea. As a result, Korean culture has gained an increased following among the Chinese public. As more and more people have become interested in studying the Korean language and culture, Chinese Koreans (*Chaoxianzu*) have taken great pride in their cultural heritage. There are now more than 30 universities in China offering classes in the Korean language, and there is great interest among many Han Chinese in learning the Korean language. At the same time, the easy availability of language materials from South Korea also makes it easier for Chinese Koreans to preserve their own language and culture. In addition, with the large amount of South Korean investment in China, Chinese Koreans can easily find jobs in these places because of their linguistic advantage of being able to speak both the Korean and Han Chinese language (Kim, 2010).

In addition, the external kin relations for some ethnic groups might have a vested interest in monitoring the Chinese government's efforts at linguistic assimilation. The most prominent examples in the Chinese case are the Tibetans in exile and the external Uyghur diaspora communities around the world. For example, the Uyghur Human Rights Campaign in the USA explicitly criticizes China's recent attempts to reduce the share of the Uyghur language in school curricula in Xinjiang.²¹ Similarly, the Tibetan government in exile in India actively monitors the Tibetan language situation in China and often criticizes China's efforts at assimilation as 'cultural genocide' (Central Tibet Administration, 2009). At least in the Tibetan case, through its overseas campaign, many development non-governmental organizations working in Tibetan areas in China now specifically devote funds towards Tibetan language education.²²

The impact of such diaspora connections on domestic inter-ethnic relations can be substantial (Sheffer, 1986). In many instances it is these diaspora communities that help sustain ethnonationalist movements (Wayland, 2004). Equally, the same can be argued for external kin states. In post-communist Europe, there are many examples of external kin states getting involved in the politics of minority languages, as in the case of Russian and Hungarian in countries with sizeable ethnic Russian and Hungarian minority populations (Bilaniuk, 2005; Csergo, 2007). Certainly, the reasons why external kin states become involved might have to do with domestic politics within each state (Brubaker, 1996, p. 67). Some external kin states are more likely to defend their co-ethnics abroad than others, especially so when there is an overly nationalist party in power who has irredentist aspirations (Van Houten, 1998). In other situations, an external kin state might not harbor such intention. This is so because the content of nationalism also matters, as '[s]ome nationalists will privilege the lost kin in neighboring territories while others will focus on enmities with ethnic rivals inside the state' (Saideman & Ayres, 2008, p. 12). Therefore, depending on different domestic political dynamics, politicians might be hard-pressed in choosing between irredentist and isolationist policies. As Saideman & Ayres (2008, p. 14) pointed out, '[w]hen leaders depended on groups that had ethnic ties to particular "lost territories," then the politicians would support irredentist policies—invasion at the extreme'. The exact mechanisms of such involvements are beyond this paper's scope. What has been emphasized in this paper is that the mere presence of these external factors at least provides the potential for such external 'meddling'.

Finally, the findings of this paper also stimulate thinking regarding dynamics governing language choice. Granted, many factors cannot easily be included in the empirical analysis presented in the paper, such as group solidarity, specific patterns of group social structure and particular relations different ethnic groups have had with the Chinese state throughout history. However, factors that have been identified as correlated with language maintenance and shift among ethnic groups in China—urbanization, ethnic language education provision and presence of external kin relations—all seem to be consistent with an instrumentalist approach. That is, language choice is conditioned on incentives provided by available opportunities and resources. As David Laitin (1998) pointed out, linguistic assimilation can occur when people perceive it is in their interest, and given that other people are perceived to be doing the same thing at the same time. For various ethnic minority groups in China, such incentive structure is increasingly taking shape as urbanization is gaining speed and ethnic language education provision is being cut. Perhaps only through the external kin connection can some groups modify this incentive structure to delay or resist this tide of linguistic assimilation into the majority Han.

Concluding Remarks

In *The Art of Not Being Governed*, James Scott comments on how, during pre-modern periods, people could simply run away from the state's incursion. The relationship between 'barbarians' and the 'civilized' can be characterized as the former electing to distance themselves from domination, and the latter trying to sedate and control the former. However, this dynamic has come to an end as the modern state machine has greatly diminished the geographical and social space for people who live in the periphery. Scott wrote:

[o]ccupying and controlling the margins of the state implied a cultural policy as well. Much of the periphery along national borders of mainland Southeast Asia is inhabited by peoples linguistically and culturally distinct from the populations that dominate the state cores ... When they could, however, all states in the region have tried to bring such peoples under their routine administration, to encourage and, more rarely, to insist upon linguistic, cultural, and religious alignment with the majority population at the state core. (Scott, 2009, pp. 8–9)

Scott's writing leaves vivid implications for how to understand China's center–peripheral relations. In China's case, its national integration project was only made possible during the PRC period, when the Communist state machine was powerful enough to penetrate into every corner of the vast territory and demand a certain linguistic and cultural integration based on the majority Han culture. The combination of mass Han migration and a capitalist market economy has further squeezed the cultural and social spaces for various ethnic groups that inhabit the periphery. This paper has documented a set of domestic and external factors that shape the linguistic landscape in China, and has shown the extent to which the Chinese state's nation-building has been successful, as well as factors hindering the linguistic and cultural incursions from the Han core on the periphery.

Perhaps one day all ethnic groups living within the Chinese territorial boundary will be assimilated. Or perhaps some ethnic groups, such as the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, will manage to secede and set up their own independent nation states.²³ The realization of the second scenario certainly depends on a plethora of factors, but if the analysis of this paper has a hint of validity, it can shed light on the crucial dynamics. As this analysis has shown, domestic factors aside, external variables play a crucial role in ethnic groups' language retention. Incidentally, the two most 'rebellious' ethnic groups in China, the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, have both internationalized their causes, although with different levels of prominence. Apart from the Chinese state and the two groups themselves, there is also a whole set of external countries/actors involved, i.e. India, the USA and the West in general for the Tibetans (Goldstein, 2006; Grunfeld, 2006), and the former Soviet Central Asia, Turkey and increasingly the West too for the Uyghurs (Shichor, 2009). With the support that the Tibetans and the Uyghurs receive internationally, one can argue that both groups have more resources and opportunities in their dealings with the Chinese state. Although international linkages might call for tougher reprisals and justifications for repression (Mylonas, forthcoming), the Chinese state is also somewhat constrained by the international spotlight on its behavior. That is to say, to solve the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang, a great deal depends on the external dimension as well, which is indeed the current paper's central message.

Notes

1. Certainly there are more complexities in the interactions between different linguistic communities. Immigrant communities often actively seek assimilation into the majority's language, while in other cases a stable diglossia can occur. For example, see Fishman (1967, 1989).
2. It is worth pointing out here that these efforts are not uniform and are often carried out gradually and in pilot programs first, which means there are great complexities in implementing these policies in various ethnic minority areas.

3. 'Tibetans in China protest proposed curbs on their language', by Edward Wong, *New York Times*, 22 October 2010.
4. By Han Chinese language, I mean any dialect classified as Han Chinese. Therefore, it is not the same as Mandarin, which is the official spoken language in China. In many parts of China, ethnic minority people might be able to speak a specific Han Chinese dialect, but not Mandarin. The phrase used in the survey is Han Chinese (*Hanyu*) instead of Mandarin (*Putonghua*).
5. There are officially 55 ethnic minority groups in China. However, this list includes the Gaoshan in Taiwan, which the Taiwanese government divides into several aboriginal tribes. As the paper's focus is on mainland China, the Gaoshan are dropped from the analysis.
6. China National Census Data 2000, available online at: www.chinadataonline.org
7. The fact that there are more languages than there are ethnic groups is because some groups are classified as one single group despite speaking different languages. There are also many 'ethnic groups' that are still not officially recognized in China.
8. One exception might be the Hui, whose identity is based primarily on their practice of Islam. There are, however, sizeable populations of Hui who speak Tibetan or Mongolian as their first language. For a good account of the Hui and their official categorization, see Gladney (1998).
9. With Mongolia as a primary exception.
10. Originally, the 1931 Constitution of the Chinese Soviet included a statement saying that all minorities living within the territory of China could enjoy the full right of self-determination. However, this explicit right of secession was dropped from the Chinese Soviet Constitution in 1935 (Mackerras, 1994, p. 72). See Sautman (1999) for a discussion about ethnic minority autonomy laws in China.
11. Data on the number of countries China shares borders with are from the *CIA World Factbook*, available online at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>
12. In his most recent work, Laitin provides a detailed justification for using language as a dimension of national membership: '[It] should be acknowledged, however, that language has special attributes that make it especially amenable to the vision of the nation that is promoted herein. Unlike monotheistic religion and race, language is not exclusive, and potential assimilants can learn a new language adding to their cultural repertoires without giving up their ancestral tongues, or really changing their cultural beliefs or identities. Yet unlike dress or music, choices about acquiring language are not subject to fashions and fads—learning a language has very heavy opportunity costs ... the intergenerational consequences for language shift have powerful implications for identity ...' (Laitin, 2007, p. 59).
13. Clarification is needed for the use of official data from China. Although some might question the validity of official Chinese data, the data sources that this paper consults are the most authoritative ones currently available.
14. Owing to the coarse nature of the survey data, we cannot see the proficiency level of different languages. We also cannot determine the circumstances in which different languages are used. Thus, we cannot determine how stable or widespread the situation of diglossia is.
15. The defining feature of the maintenance type of bilingual education is the use of the ethnic group's mother tongue throughout the course of elementary and/or secondary schools. Within the maintenance type, there are also several subtypes based on the relative weights given to Han Chinese and minority languages at various stages, although this paper does not break out different subtypes owing to the unavailability of relevant data.
16. Ethnologue is a website that provides information about languages around the world. Although it might not be the perfect source, it does provide the most comprehensive coverage of diverse languages within a country. For the purpose of my data collection, I searched within the language section using the names of the officially identified ethnic group. If I found information noting the international distribution of the group, it was coded as '1'. The search function at Ethnologue is available online at: http://www.ethnologue.com/language_index.asp
17. Both Tibetans and Uyghurs received a two. Thus, I do not consider both groups to have external kin that have independent statehood, yet both groups do enjoy certain group autonomy and political cohesion. The Tibetans have an exile government led by the Dalai Lama. The Uyghurs have an active diaspora community headed by the World Uyghur Congress, and they also have an exile government based in Washington, DC (Shichor, 2007).
18. For the purpose of robust test, I ran separate testing by dropping the Hui and Manchu from the data, because of their overwhelming level of linguistic assimilation. Results for the regression analysis did not change substantially.

19. Owing to the relatively small *N* of the observations, I also did a bootstrap test for every model, and the coefficients and significance levels did not change substantially.
20. The political repression variable is measured by the number of political prisoners in China for each ethnic group. Data for this variable are from the United States Congressional–Executive Commission on China’s Political Prisoner Database, available online at: <http://www.cecc.gov/pages/victims/index/php>. The literacy rate variable comes from the *China Ethnic Statistical Yearbook 2005*, and it measures the percentage of group population over the age of 15 years who have gone through some years of state school education. Elite mobility is measured by calculating the number of representatives a certain ethnic minority group had at the Chinese Communist Party’s 17th National Party Congress convened in 2007, which can be accessed at: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64100/6064872.html>. For religion, a dummy variable was generated to address whether a minority group is predominantly Muslim, and there are 10 groups in China in this category (Gladney, 1999, p. 57).
21. See <http://uhrp.org/categories/Issues/Cultural-Assimilation-and-Economic-Segregation/>
22. For example, see the mission statement of Trace Foundation, available online at: http://www.trace.org/about/about_mission.html
23. Certainly there is a possibility of a third scenario. That is, when China democratizes in the future, a loosely confederated political system might emerge that allows a genuine autonomy for ethnic minority groups in China that tolerates multiculturalism and multilingualism. In this scenario, for example, Tibet will regain the cultural and linguistic autonomy that the Dalai Lama seeks while remaining within the political structure of China.

References

- Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso).
- Bilaniuk, L. (2005) *Contested Tongues: Language Policies and Cultural Correction in Ukraine* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).
- Borchert, T. (2006) *Educating Monks: Buddhism, Politics and Freedom of Religion on China’s Southwest Border*, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Borchert, T. (2008) Worry for the Dai Nation: Sipsongpanna, Chinese modernity, and the problems of Buddhist modernism, *Journal of Asian Studies*, 67(1), pp. 107–142.
- Bovingdon, G. (2004) *Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent* (Washington, DC: East–West Center Washington).
- Brown, M.E. (1996) *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Brubaker, R. (1996) *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Bunce, V. (1999) *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Central Tibet Administration (2009) *China’s Attempt to Wipe out the Language and Culture of Tibet. Tibetan Response to China’s White Paper of 25 September 2008*, available online at: <http://www.tibet.net/en/pdf/diirpub/politics/2009white/1.pdf>
- Cornell, S. (2000) Autonomy as a source of conflict: Caucasian conflicts in theoretical perspective, *World Politics*, 54(2), pp. 245–276.
- Csergo, Z. (2007) *Talk of the Nation: Language and Conflict in Romania and Slovakia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).
- Diana, A. (2009) Re-configuring belonging in post-socialist Xishuangbanna, China, in: A. Walker (Ed.), *Tai Lands and Thailand: Community and State in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press).
- Deutsch, K. (1966) *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).
- Dreyer, J.T. (1976) *China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
- Dwyer, A.M. (2005) *The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse* (Washington, DC: East–West Center Washington).

- Fearon, J. & Laitin, D. (2000) Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity, *International Organization*, 54(4), pp. 845–877.
- Fishman, J.A. (1964) Language maintenance and language shift as a field of inquiry, *Linguistics*, 2(9), pp. 32–70.
- Fishman, J.A. (1967) Bilingualism with and without diglossia; diglossia with and without bilingualism, *Journal of Social Issues*, 23(2), pp. 29–38.
- Fishman, J.A. (1972) *Language and Nationalism* (Rowley: Newbury House).
- Fishman, J.A. (1980) Minority language maintenance and the ethnic mother tongue school, *The Modern Language Journal*, 64(2), pp. 167–172.
- Fishman, J.A. (1989) *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (Clevedon and Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters).
- Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- Gladney, D.C. (1998) *Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers).
- Gladney, D.C. (1999) Making Muslims in China: education, Islamicization and presentation, in: G.A. Postiglione (Ed.), *China's National Minority Education* (New York and London: Falmer Press).
- Gladney, D.C. (2004) *Dislocating China: Reflections on Muslims, Minorities, and other Subaltern Subjects* (London: C. Hurst).
- Goldstein, M. (2006) The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8(3), pp. 145–164.
- Grunfeld, A.T. (2006) Tibet and the United States, in: B. Sautman & J.T. Dreyer (Eds), *Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, and Society in a Disputed Region* (New York: Armonk; and London: M.E. Sharpe).
- Hale, H. (2004) Divided we stand: institutional sources of ethnofederal state survival and collapse, *World Politics*, 56(2), pp. 165–193.
- Han, E. (2011) The dog that hasn't barked: assimilation and resistance in Inner Mongolia, China, *Asian Ethnicity*, 12(1), pp. 55–75.
- Harrell, S. (1993) Linguistics and hegemony in China, *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, 103, pp. 97–114.
- Harrell, S. (1995) Introduction: civilizing projects and the reaction to them, in: S. Harrell (Ed.), *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers* (Seattle: University of Washington Press).
- Huntington, S.P. (1993) The clash of civilizations?, *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), pp. 22–49.
- Jenne, E.K. (2007) *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- Kim, H. (2010) *International Ethnic Networks and Intra-ethnic Conflict: Koreans in China* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
- Laitin, D. (1986) *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Laitin, D. (1988) Language games, *Comparative Politics*, 20(3), pp. 289–302.
- Laitin, D. (1989) Linguistic revival: politics and culture in Catalonia, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31(2), pp. 297–317.
- Laitin, D. (1998) *Identity in Formation: The Russian-speaking Populations in the New Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- Laitin, D. (2007) *Nations, States, and Violence* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).
- Lake, D.A. & Rothchild, D.S. (1998) *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Leff, C.S. (1999) Democratization and disintegration in multinational states, *World Politics*, 51(2), pp. 205–235.
- Mackerras, C. (1994) *China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century* (Hong Kong, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).
- Mylonas, H. (forthcoming) *The Politics of Nation-building: The Making of Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Paulston, C.B. (1994) *Linguistic Minorities in Multilingual Settings* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company).
- Posner, D. (2005) *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- PRC State Council Language Commission Language Usage Survey Office (2006) *Chinese Language Usage Survey Data* [Zhongguo Yuyan Wenzhi Shiyong Qingkuang Diaocha Ziliao] (Beijing: Language Publishing Office (Yuwen Chubanshe)).

- PRC State Ethnic Affairs Commission Economic and Development Department and PRC State Statistical Bureau Department of Integrated Statistics (2006) *China Language Usage Survey Data* [Zhongguo Yuyan Wenzhi Shiyong Qingkuang Diaocha Ziliao] (Beijing: Language Publishing Office (*Yuwen Chubanshe*))
- Prunier, G. (1995) *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Roeder, P. (1991) Soviet federalism and ethnic mobilization, *World Politics*, 43(2), pp. 196–232.
- Safran, W. (1992) Language, ideology, and state-building: a comparison of policies in France, Israel, and the Soviet Union, *International Political Science Review*, 13(4), pp. 397–414.
- Saideman, S.M. (2001) *The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and International Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Saideman, S.M. & Ayers, R.W. (2008) *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Sautman, B. (1999) Ethnic law and minority rights in China: progress and constraints, *Law & Policy*, 21(3), pp. 283–314.
- Schluessel, E. (2007) ‘Bilingual’ education and discontent in Xinjiang, *Central Asian Survey*, 26(2), pp. 251–277.
- Scott, J.C. (2009) *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).
- Shakya, T. (2000) *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947* (New York: Penguin Compass).
- Sheffer, G. (1986) *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
- Shichor, Y. (2007) Limping on two legs: Uyghur diaspora organizations and the prospects for Eastern Turkestan independence, *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 6(48), pp. 117–125.
- Shichor, Y. (2009) *Ethno-diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations* (Honolulu, HI: East–West Center).
- Stites, R. (1999) Writing cultural boundaries: national minority language policy, literacy planning, and bilingual education, in: G.A. Postiglione (Ed.), *China’s National Minority Education* (New York and London: Falmer Press).
- Suny, R. (1993) *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
- Toft, M.D. (2002) Indivisible territory, geographic concentration, and ethnic war, *Security Studies*, 12(2), pp. 82–119.
- Toft, M.D. (2003) *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Van Houten, P. (1998) The role of a minority’s reference state in ethnic relations, *Archives Europeenes de Sociologie* [European Journal of Sociology], 34(2), pp. 110–146.
- Walker, E. (2003) *Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield).
- Wayland, S. (2004) Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lanka Tamil diaspora, *Review of International Studies*, 30, pp. 405–426.
- Weber, E. (1976) *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
- Weidmann, N.B. (2009) Geography as motivation and opportunity: group concentration and ethnic conflict, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(4), pp. 526–543.
- Weiner, M. (1971) The Macedonian syndrome: an historical model of international relations and political development, *World Politics*, 23(4), pp. 665–683.
- Zhou, M. (2001) The politics of bilingual education in the People’s Republic of China since 1949, *Bilingual Research Journal*, 25(1/2), pp. 147–171.